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ownership structure. This is a new and important approach because these changes are fre-
quently related to corporate performance. Third, we analyze the higher levels of ownership
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ownership is of minor relevance in the German manufacturing sector. However, our measure
of cross-ownership represents only a lower bound.
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Non-Technical Summary
Corporate ownership structures around the world are very diverse but there seem to be two
distinct groups. In the Anglo-Saxon countries the majority of shares is widely held, whereas
in continental Europe shares tend to be concentrated in the hands of a few large shareholders.
For Germany, empirical studies report large share blocks and cross-ownership of firms. Fur-
thermore, it is often assumed that ownership structures in Germany do not change much over
time.
Ownership structure is one important element of the complex system of corporate governance
– the legal and institutional framework by which enterprises are governed. Economic theory
suggests that managers of large corporations will not maximize shareholder value, i.e. act in
the best interest of the shareholders, if they are not controlled by a small number of share-
holders. But also the type of shareholder can influence management behavior: agency costs
resulting from a divergence of ownership and control should be relatively small if individuals
are the shareholders because corporate shareholders like other non-financial firms have inter-
nal agency conflicts.
This study documents the ownership structure of large German manufacturing firms for the
years 1994-1998 and identifies potential sources of agency costs. It includes a large number of
firms which possibly can have agency costs, i.e. listed and non-listed firms as well as firms in
the legal form of the AG and GmbH.
The analysis shows that shareholdings in German manufacturing firms are indeed highly con-
centrated in the hands of very few shareholders. The average size of the largest share block is
over 81% in 1998. From this perspective, agency costs should be small. However, in the ma-
jority of firms the largest shareholder is another non-financial firm. Agency costs are there-
fore more likely to arise within the controlling shareholder. Second, ownership structures are
not constant over time. Concentration of shares changes in about 75% of all listed firms. This
suggests that there is an active market for corporate shares in Germany. Third, only the mi-
nority of firms is controlled through pyramids of owners. But about 40% of the shareholders
that ultimately control a firms are non-financial enterprises – again an indicator of agency
costs resulting from agency conflicts within the controlling shareholder. Finally, cross-
shareholdings are of minor relevance in German firms in terms of the number of firms ulti-
mately controlled by these control systems. In terms of firm size the relevance of cross-
shareholdings increases slightly. This does not stand in contrast to the intense discussion of
cross-shareholdings in Germany because this study focuses on the manufacturing sector and
the estimates on cross-ownership represent only lower bounds.
11 Introduction
Corporate ownership structures around the world are very diverse but there seem to be two
distinct groups (LA PORTA et al. 1999). In the Anglo-Saxon countries the majority of shares is
widely held, whereas in continental Europe shares tend to be concentrated in the hands of a
few large shareholders. 1 For Germany, empirical studies report large share blocks and cross-
ownership of firms (ADAMS 1994, WENGER and KASERER 1997, BECHT and BÖHMER 1999).
The ownership structure of firms is an important element of corporate governance – the com-
plex system of legal, institutional and market forces by which firms are governed (BERLE and
MEANS 1932). 2 Economic theory suggests that large shareholders have the power and the in-
centives to monitor management and to press for value maximization (SHLEIFER and VISHNY
1986). On the other hand, when protection of minority shareholders is weak they might be
exploited by large shareholders. The classical problem of corporate governance – the minimi-
zation of agency costs resulting from a separation of ownership and control (JENSEN and
MECKLING 1976: 328) – also depends on the type of the shareholders. Corporate shareholders
have internal agency conflicts and might therefore be weak monitors (VON THADDEN 1990).
Likewise, pyramid structures and cross-shareholdings might limit efficient monitoring of
managers (BEBCHUK ET AL. 1998).
The empirical evidence for Germany on the relationship of ownership structure and share-
holder value is limited and often contradicting. 3 Descriptive evidence, however, on the Ger-
man ownership structure is accumulating.  BÖHMER (1998) and BECHT and BÖHMER (1999)
analyze the ownership structure of the listed Aktiengesellschaft (AG), 4 one form of a Kapital-
gesellschaft, 5 in detail but only on the first level of ownership. KAMMERATH (1999) provides
valuable information on a much wider sample of all large German firms. BEYER (1998) fo-
cuses on pyramids and cross-shareholdings of German firms. But both studies neglect changes
in the ownership structure over time.
                                                
1 See PROWSE (1994) and FRANKS and MAYER (1995) for international comparisons.
2 See SHORT (1994) for a survey of empirical studies examining the effect of ownership structure on perform-
ance.
3 See CABLE (1985), NIBLER (1995), GORTON and SCHMID (1996) and SEGER (1997).
4 Public company with limited liability.
5 Company with limited liability which is generally run by managers who are not the single owners.
2New Questions
Ownership structures are not necessarily constant over time. If they change, this might have
an effect on corporate governance which should be considered in any empirical study. When
ownership structures change over time but are treated as being constant this will bias esti-
mates. 6 DENIS and SARIN (1999) find for the US that changes in the ownership structure are
closely linked to prior stock price performance and consecutive board changes.
Currently, we can identify several forces of change. Institutional investors have been in-
creasing their participation in equity markets for two decades (BLOMMESTEIN 1998). Deregu-
lation within the EU will free those investors from portfolio restrictions which could lead to a
further increase in their investment activity. Founder succession – which is of particular im-
portance in Germany (GERKE et al. 1995) – could change the composition of shareholders
significantly. Finally, international competition and current concentration on so-called ‘core
competencies’ could cause firms to divest peripheral activities which in turn would result in
ownership changes. Here causality is not totally clear. But the study of the time changes in the
ownership structure may provide additional insights into causality.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to document the ownership structures of large German manufac-
turing firms. It tries to address several shortcomings of the previous German empirical litera-
ture: First, we include all types of firms in the legal form of a Kapitalgesellschaft in the analy-
sis. 7 We therefore have data on a large number of firms which are not listed on the stock ex-
change but are also likely to have agency conflicts. This increases sample size considerably.
Second, we document the development of the ownership structures over the years 1994-1998
showing that they are not constant as often assumed. Third, we try to find the ultimate owners
in complex ownership structures like pyramids. This is an essential approach when firms are
governed through pyramids. Finally, we quantify cross-ownership and find that – contrary to
the general perception – this issue is of minor relevance in the German manufacturing sector.
However, our measure of cross-ownership represents only a lower bound.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses why the ownership structure of firms
theoretically affects corporate governance and what measures of ownership structure are suit-
                                                
6 See HIMMELBERG et al. (1999) for formal evidence and an empirical example on this.
7 These are: the listed/non-listed public company with limited liability (AG), the limited partnership on shares
(KGaA) and the private company with limited liability (GmbH).
3able in this context. Section 3 describes the data source. Section 4 presents the results and
discusses implications for the size of agency costs. Section 5 concludes with some implica-
tions for future research in the field of corporate governance, in particular in Germany.
2 Measurement Concepts
Economic theory suggests that the ownership structure of enterprises affects their perform-
ance. In this chapter we discuss the role of different dimensions of ownership structure: size
of share blocks, types of shareholders, pyramids and cross-ownership and suggest empirical
measures of ownership structure which are based on economic theory. We begin with a short
discussion of the type of the firm which is relevant for corporate governance analysis. We
also discuss the impact of other firm-specific characteristics (legal form or going public) on
the role of ownership structures and their effects on agency costs.
2.1 Legal Form and Going Public
From the theoretical perspective, any firm with a separation of ownership and control should
be included in a study on corporate governance (JENSEN and MECKLING 1976). For Germany
this means to focus on Kapitalgesellschaften 8 because these firms, in contrast to partnerships
and single proprietorships, generally are run by managers who only own small ownership
stakes – if at all. 9 There are two legal forms for a Kapitalgesellschaft: the GmbH 10 (private
company with limited liability) and the AG 11 (public company with limited liability). The AG
can be listed on the stock exchange whereas the GmbH cannot. 12
Many firm-specific factors theoretically influence the size of agency costs. 13 The structure of
ownership on which we focus here is one of them. But also the legal form and the decision to
go public could affect agency costs. 14 In the GmbH owners can monitor their managers much
closer than in the AG. 15 But shares of an AG are easier to trade than shares of a GmbH, espe-
                                                
8 A Kapitalgesellschaft is a company with limited liability which is generally run by managers who are not the
single owners.
9 There is no agency problem only when a firm is 100 percent owned by a single shareholder who is at the same
time the only manager. He also must be an individual. This issue will be discussed in detail below.
10 Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH).
11 Aktiengesellschaft (AG).
12 Two other legal forms are of minor importance: the GmbH & Co. KG (a mixture of a partnership and a Kapi-
talgesellschaft) and the KGaA (a partnership that emitted tradable shares).
13 See SHLEIFER and VISHNY (1997) for an excellent survey on these factors.
14 See STEINER (1998) on the choice of a legal form and its consequences.
15 The general meeting of shareholders can give directions to the management in the GmbH.
4cially when the AG is listed on the stock exchange. This makes monitoring by ‘exit’ more
attractive compared to monitoring by ‘voice’ as in the GmbH. In turn, new capital is easier to
raise by a listed AG in the stock market. Wealth of shareholders put a constraint on this in the
GmbH. 16 A downside of an AG might be that an internal control institution, the Aufsichtsrat
17, is required. This potentially reduces the voice of the original owner. Efficient control might
be hindered because workers have a right to sit on that board.18 This could disturb homogene-
ity of interests on the board.19 The potential advantage of the GmbH of not having to have an
Aufsichtsrat disappears when the GmbH exceeds a certain size.
Agency costs might be different in the GmbH than in the AG. If a particular legal form or the
decision to go public is chosen by the owner this will be the result of a complex optimization
problem in which agency costs constitute only one element.20 Therefore, ownership structures
as described below must be interpreted cautiously. They as well as the choice of the legal
form can be the result of an optimization problem and need not influence agency costs  per se.
For example, trading of shares on a stock exchange could lead to dispersion of shares in the
listed AG. Then the ownership structure is endogenous.
2.2 Size of Share Blocks
SHLEIFER and VISHNY (1986) use the size of the largest share block as a measure of owner-
ship. They argue that only in the presence of a large minority shareholder takeovers can be an
effective disciplining device. 21 When all shares are dispersed initially, free-riding of small
shareholders will make any takeover attempt unattractive (GROSSMAN and HART 1980). But
concentration of shares also has costs. DEMSETZ and LEHN argue (1985) that large sharehold-
ers are not diversified and hence bear excessive risk. A growing literature discusses expro-
priation of small minority shareholders by a large shareholder. Large owners who are also the
managers can have full control over the firm’s assets but not share in all the costs they gener-
ate. If they are wealthy enough they might prefer private benefits to maximization of firm
value. 22 Our preferred measure of the voting power of the largest shareholder is the size of the
                                                
16 See BOLTON and VON THADDEN (1996) on the decision to go public and its implications for control.
17 Board of directors.
18 The participation of workers depends on the size and the industry of the firm.
19 See HOPT (1998) for a critical analysis of the two-tiered German boards.
20 Taxes and liability play no role in this decision because they are identical for all forms of the Kapitalgesell-
schaft . Disclosure requirements depend on firm size. But most firms covered in this analysis are large.
21 See FRANKS and MAYER (1994) who find that large shareholders are associated with higher turnover of direc-
tors in Germany.
22 See MORCK et al. (1988) for empirical evidence for the US.
5largest share block (C1).23 However, we calculate some additional measures: the combined
share stake of the two and three largest shareholders (C2 and C3 respectively) to get an idea of
the upper distribution of the ownership structure. Second, we use an approximation of the
Herfindahl index to measure absolute concentration of shares and to allow for comparison
with other studies. 24 Third, we calculate a measure of the voting power of the largest share-
holder as suggested by CUBBIN and LEECH (1983).25 It approximates the probability that the
largest shareholder can win a vote given that small shareholder might oppose. 26 Definitions of
all measures are summarized in the appendix.
2.3 Type of Shareholders
A second dimension of ownership structure is the type of the shareholders. In the center of
corporate governance analysis stands the distinction between dispersed and concentrated
shareholdings. Although dispersion of shares is rather a matter of size of share blocks as dis-
cussed above we treat dispersed shares as one type of shareholder. In contrast to previous em-
pirical studies, our definition of dispersed shares does not depend on the size of the largest
block. 27 We treat shares only then as dispersed when they are dispersed according to our da-
tabase.28
Individuals can be good monitors in comparison to corporate shareholders because they do
not have any internal agency conflicts. Corporate shareholders substitute one agency conflict
with another (VON  THADDEN 1990). In turn, since individuals usually face wealth constraints
they might be too risk-averse. Wealthy and well-diversified corporate shareholders could in-
duce more efficient investment decisions.
The group of corporate shareholders is diverse. For example, creditors as shareholders might
force a company to forego good investment opportunities because they focus on the downside
of the earnings distribution (MYERS 1977). Insurance companies or universal banks which
have regular business relationships besides their investment are unlikely to oppose manage-
ment (POUND 1988). This also applies to non-financial firms as shareholders. Pension funds,
                                                
23 This is a valid proxy when the largest shareholder holds more than 50 percent of the shares in most firms.
24 This is a lower bound of concentration because we do not have data on all shareholder (e.g. dispersed shares).
25 When the largest share block C1 is over 50 percent (as is the case here), the difference between absolute and
relative measures of concentration is negligible (FEUERSTACK 1999).
26 See LEECH and LEAHY (1991) for an application of this measure on British firms.
27 See SHORT (1994) for a review of the different definitions of dispersed versus concentrated shares applied in
empirical studies.
28 In a few cases ownership of shares does not add up to 100 percent. In these cases the rest was also treated as
dispersed shares.
6on the contrary, with no business relationships to their investment objects might be good
monitors. But the merits of institutional investors are highly debated. 29 In the following we
differentiate only between financial and non-financial enterprises because we have no con-
sistent information on different types of financial enterprises.
Another type of shareholder is the state. SHAPIRO and WILLIG (1990) show that firms gov-
erned by bureaucrats should perform better under private management because bureaucrats
lack the incentives to maximize shareholder value.
Finally, foreigners might exhibit a different control behavior than domestic investors. For
example, institutional investors especially from the United States and Great Britain are very
active institutional shareholders (SMITH 1996, CARLETON et al. 1998). Combined with their
growing importance as a shareholder group (BLOMMESTEIN 1998) this makes a separate cate-
gory for those shareholders desirable.30
In sum, we look at six different types of shareholders: dispersed shares, individuals, non-
financial enterprises, financial enterprises, the state and foreigners.
2.4 Pyramids and Cross-Ownership
Third, we look at the vertical dimension of the shareholder structure. We do not only consider
the first level of owners but also the owners of the owners. For Germany, pyramids and cross-
ownership are the most important ownership structures.31
                                                
29 See BLACK (1997), KARPOFF (1998) and DEL GUERCIO and HAWKINS (1999) for recent surveys on institutional
investor activism. See BLACK (1992) and BLAIR (1995) on the theoretical merits of this class of investors. See
PORTER (1992) for critical arguments.
30 The term ‘foreigners’ here and in the following refers to corporate foreigners only, both financial and non-
financial. Data do not allow to consistently distinguish between these two foreign types of corporates.
31 LA PORTA et al. (1999) document that pyramids are a worldwide phenomenon. On cross-shareholdings in
Germany see ADAMS (1994), BEYER (1998) and KAMMERATH (1999).
72.4.1 Pyramids
Figure 1: Pyramid of Owners
In this pyramid firm A is controlled by firm B whereas firm B is controlled by firm C, the
ultimate owner. We define the ultimate owner as the shareholder who has full control over a
firm (either direct through a share of over 50 percent or indirect through a control chain as
depicted in Figure 1) and itself is not controlled by another majority shareholder.32 We define
a pyramid as a control structure by which an ultimate owner controls another firm through a
control chain of over 50 percent at each level with at least one intermediate firm.33
This kind of ownership structure can generate agency costs. First, control might be diluted
within high pyramids when transaction costs affect the flow of information. Second, pyramids
can serve large shareholders as a control device to expropriate minority shareholders.
GROSSMAN and HART (1988) and HARRIS and RAVIV (1988) argue that pyramids generate a
departure from the one-share-one-vote scheme. Large shareholders can divert cash flow to
themselves rather than to pay it out to all shareholders. On the other hand, if we assume that
cash flow is paid out to investors according to their voting rights, the ultimate shareholder in a
pyramid might receive less cash flow than would be expected regarding only his actual voting
power. To give an example, firm C in Figure 1 controls firm A but receives only a minority
share of cash flow (50.1% x 50.1% = 25.1%). This could disrupt its incentives to control firm
A efficiently (BEBCHUK et al. 1998).34 In sum, we use three measures to characterize pyra-
                                                
32 A majority of 50 percent does not guarantee ongoing control. A majority of 75 percent is required to exchange
management during its period of office (§ 103 (1) AktG) or to incorporate a firm into the own firm (§§ 2 ff.
UmwG). But a 50 percent majority is sufficient to dismiss management after their regular period of office. A
share much lower than 50 percent can be sufficient when the rest of the shares is dispersed or when the corporate
charter limits the voting rights of minority shareholders. Without more detailed information 50 percent is the best
proxy available.
33 LA PORTA et al. (1999) use a share size of 10 percent and 20 percent at each level for 27 countries, REN-
NEBOOG (1996) share sizes of 25 percent, 50 percent and 75 percent for Be lgium.
34 Full control over cash flow requires a majority of 75 percent (§§ 2 ff. UmwG). But when dividends are paid
out relative to share size, share size can be used as a proxy for cash flow rights.
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8mids: first, the level of ultimate control. Second, the measure proposed by BEBCHUK et al.
(1998):
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whereby Pi is the controlling share on level i, the share Pi >50% and N is the ultimate level of
control. Third, in order to see if there is a separation of cash flow and control as argued above
we calculate the ratio of cash flow rights of the ultimate owner (the measure a) to the size of
the largest share block C1 on the first level of the pyramid.35
2.4.2 Cross-Ownership
Cross-ownership which is regularly discussed as a typical feature of the German ownership
structure (e.g. WENGER and KASERER 1997, BEYER 1998) can generate so-called ‘insider-
systems’ (FRANKS and MAYER 1995). These systems are characterized by a lack of control by
outside investors. Insiders such as managers might not be held accountable because the firm is
either widely-held or has large owners which are themselves partially owned by the firm in
consideration. These two-way share linkages could hinder efficient monitoring.
We define that a firm is part of an insider-system when it directly or indirectly owns some
fraction of its own shares. We further define that a firm is controlled by an insider-system
when its ultimate shareholder is part of an insider-system. Our measure of an insider-system is
the degree of cross-ownership: the cumulated fraction of shares a particular firm owns in it-
self. If cross-ownership is greater than zero we say that the particular firm is part of an in-
sider-system. Figure 2 graphically illustrates an insider-system:
Figure 2: Cross-Ownership
                                                
35 The share size on the first level is used as a proxy for the extent of control as desired by the ultimate owner.
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9In Figure 2 firm A holds 40 percent of the shares in firm B which in turn holds 100 percent of
the shares in firm C, and firm C holds 40 percent of the shares in firm A. Therefore firm A (as
well as firms B and C) is part of an insider-system because it owns 16 percent of its own
shares, the degree of cross-ownership. Furthermore, firm D which is fully controlled by firm
A is controlled by an insider-system because its ultimate shareholder, firm A, is part of an
insider-system. Note that – in contrast to FRANKS and MAYER (1995) – we do not require that
all firms in an insider-system hold shares of at least 50 percent in each other. Thus our defini-
tion of an insider-system is broader. The reason is that firms can use many other instruments
to immunize themselves from the control of outsiders, e.g. multiple voting rights or caps on
voting rights which are not reflected in the ownership structure of shares.
All definitions and measurement concepts of ownership structure discussed so far are summa-
rized in the appendix.
3 Data
Firm-level data on ownership structures are obtained from the KONZERNSTRUKTUR-
DATENBANK (KSD), a commercially available database.36 KSD has been existing since 1994.
Each year four updates are released on CD-ROM. The 2/98 update, for example, contains
38,788 observations on German banks, insurance companies, non-financial companies, hold-
ing companies, capital investment companies,37 foundations, government authorities and ind i-
viduals. Further details can be found in KÖKE (1999).
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on KSD (Update 2-1998)
AG GmbH1 KGaA Other Total Percent of Total
Population2
Observations 2,340 20,835 29 15,584 38,788 1.40
Percent of Total Population2 96.89 5.04 n.a. n.a. 1.40 ---
Sales ³ 1 million DM 1,380 7,363 15 1,201 9,959 1.91
Sales ³ 10 million DM 1,246 6,680 15 1,018 8,959 13.90
Sales ³ 100 million DM 893 2,695 13 456 4,057 64.6
Notes: 1 Including GmbH&Co.KG; 2 Total population refers to data on the year 1996 taken from STATISTISCHES
BUNDESAMT (1999). KGaA is included in AG, no aggregate data are available for GmbH&Co.KG separately;
therefore the percentages represent only a very rough estimate.
Source: KSD update 2-1998; STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT (1999), Sales Tax Statistic, Table VIIb; own calcula-
tions.
                                                
36 COMPANY STRUCTURE DATABASE form Verlag Hoppenstedt GmbH in Darmstadt/Germany;
http://www.hoppenstedt.de.
37 I.e. the German Kapitalanlagegesellschaften.
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As can be seen from Table 1, more than 23,200 firms in KSD are run in the legal form of a
Kapitalgesellschaft. 38 About 15,600 observations relate to partnerships, households, public
municipalities etc. which are not subject of this study. Compared with the total German
population coverage of the AG is very good (almost 97 percent) but only a small part of all
GmbHs (about 5 percent) is contained in KSD. However, as firm size increases (measured by
sales) coverage of KSD improves also for GmbHs. For example, KSD contains about 64.4
percent of firms with sales higher than 100 million DM for the year 1998. 39
We collect data on five consecutive years (1994-1998) to get a better picture of the develop-
ment of ownership structure over time. This is a new approach because previous studies on
Germany only analyze a single year for analysis. We exclude all firms which are not a Kapi-
talgesellschaft. In addition, we focus on the manufacturing sector to allow comparisons with
previous studies. After this selection procedure we obtain a sample of 5,788 observations for
the years 1994-1998. About 90 percent of these firms are large in terms of German Trade Law
(HGB), i.e. have sales over 32 million DM and balance sheet total over 15.5 million DM.
Table 2: Observations by Year and Legal Form
Year GmbH AG KGaA Total
total thereof
listed
total thereof
listed
total thereof
listed
1994 528 341 167 2 1 871 168
1995 576 361 175 2 1 939 176
1996 613 398 196 3 2 1014 198
1997 797 638 321 10 7 1445 328
1998 843 666 348 10 7 1519 355
Total 3357 2404 1207 27 18 5788 1225
Percent of all obser-
vations
58.00 41.53 20.85 0.47 0.31 100.00 21.16
Note: The following editions of KSD were used: 3-1994, 2-1995, 2-1996, 1-1997, 2-1998.
The majority of firms has the legal form of the GmbH (58 percent) and about half of the AGs
are listed on a stock exchange. Overall, only 21 percent of all observations are listed firms.
Thus – in contrast to previous German studies – we have data on a large amount of firms
which are also likely to have principal-agent conflicts but are not run as an AG or are not
listed.
                                                
38 These are: AG, GmbH, GmbH&Co.KG, KGaA.
39 This is only a lower bound estimate because many firms in KSD do not have sales data.
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4 Results
Making use of the measurement concepts developed in section 2 we now describe the owner-
ship structure of large German manufacturing firms run as a Kapitalgesellschaft.
4.1 Size of Share Blocks
German shareholdings are highly concentrated in the hands of only very few shareholders.
Table 3 shows the largest share blocks C1, C2 and C3 as defined in section 2.2 in the aggregate
and by legal form.
Table 3: Size of Largest Share Block by Legal Form in 19981
in percent GmbH Non-Listed AG Listed AG Weighted Average2
C1 89.44 83.23 57.66 81.06
C2 96.06 90.76 65.15 88.07
C3 97.08 92.14 67.69 89.50
Number of Observations3 841 312 325 1486
Note: 1 The measure could not be calculated for 33 observations because only dispersed shares were recorded for
these. 2 Including KGaA. 3 The KGaA is not reported here as a separate category because the number of obser-
vations is only 8.
In 1998, the largest share was very high with 81.1 percent on average. Adding the shares of
the second and third largest shareholder their combined holdings increased to almost 90 per-
cent. Differentiating by legal form shows that in the GmbH the average largest share is about
32 percentage points higher than in the listed AG. Together the three largest shares make up
over 97 percent. Comparing the listed versus the non-listed AG we see that the average largest
share in the listed AG is much lower than in the non-listed AG.
These numbers are very high compared with US enterprises but also compared with firms in
other European countries.40 Descriptive evidence can be found in BECHT (1997) for the US,
CRESPI (1997) for Spain, DE JONG et al. (1997) for the Netherlands and BIANCHI et al. (1997)
for Italy. 41
Due to the theoretical importance of the largest shareholder we choose the measure C1 for
closer scrutiny. Figure 3 shows the density function of C1 for the listed AG.
                                                
40 The cumulated share of the three largest shareholders is: 42% in the US (BECHT  1997), 57.5% in Spain
(CRESPI 1997), 31.4% in the Netherlands (DE JONG et al. 1997) and 89.8% in Italy (BIANCHI et al. 1997).
41 Evidence on other European countries see ECGN (1997).
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Figure 3: Density Function of Largest Share Block C1
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Note: Data for 1994-1998 on the listed AG.
In Germany specific shareholder rights are connected with specific block sizes. A share of 25
percent implies the right to veto proposed changes of the corporate charter. With a majority of
50 percent the shareholder can appoint and dismiss management 42 and with a supermajority
of 75 percent this shareholders’ decisions are not endangered by a veto from minority share-
holders. 43 Figure 3 suggests that the size of the largest share is influenced by these legal
rights. In other words, shareholders tend to buy that amount of shares which is necessary for
control purposes.
Table 4: Cumulative Distribution of Largest Share Block C1
in  percent GmbH Non-Listed AG Listed AG Weighted Average2
³99% of shares 71.03 56.76 6.69 54.87
³90% of shares 75.74 64.53 20.33 62.04
³75% of shares 79.55 70.19 33.10 68.03
³50% of shares 93.74 88.01 59.77 85.61
³25% of shares 98.00 95.69 82.28 94.28
Number of Observations3 3355 1151 1184 5712
Note: 1 The measure could not be calculated for 76 observations because only dispersed shares were recorded for
these. 2 Including KGaA. 3 The KGaA is not reported here as a separate category because the number of obser-
vations is only 22.
Table 4 shows how many of the sample firms have a large shareholder and what the size of C1
is. We see that in 54.9 percent of all firms the largest shareholder holds 99 percent or more of
                                                
42 For regular elections of the board a 50 percent majority is required in the AG. For elections before the regular
end of the period of office a 75 percent majority is required (§103 (1) AktG)
43 Even smaller share sizes can provide a sufficient majority when the corporate charter contains voting right
restrictions. However, they are illegal from the year 2000 on (WpHG).
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the shares. Thus the majority of firms is controlled by a single owner. From this perspective,
agency problems resulting from expropriation of small shareholders through large sharehold-
ers are unlikely because most firms do not have any minority shareholders. In over 85.6 per-
cent of the firms the largest shareholder owns 50 percent or more of the shares. Thus most
firms have a large shareholder – which is very large in comparison with UK and US share-
holders44 – that could govern the firm efficiently. But the quality of monitoring also depends
on the type of the largest shareholder.
Table 4 also shows that – on average – the largest shareholder is relatively small in the listed
AG. In only 6.7 percent of the listed AGs he holds 99 percent of the shares or more, compared
to 56.8 percent of the non-listed AGs and 71 percent of the GmbHs. Almost 60 percent of the
firms listed on the stock exchange have a shareholder that holds 50 percent and more of the
shares. The numbers for the non-listed AG and the GmbH are even higher: 88 percent and
93.7 percent respectively. From this perspective it seems reasonable to analyze primarily the
listed AG because agency costs resulting from weak control by the dominant shareholder
might be the highest here.
Table 5: Concentration of Shares: Herfindahl and Cubbin & Leech Indices
GmbH Non-Listed AG Listed AG Weighted Average1
Herfindahl Index 0.856 0.769 0.403 0.741
Percent of Observations with Vo t-
ing Power Index=1
85.25 80.79 62.30 79.35
Number of Observations2 3357 1197 1207 5788
Note: 1 Including KGaA. 2 The KGaA is not reported here as a separate category because the number of obser-
vations is only 27.
Table 5 confirms that GmbH shares are highly concentrated since the Herfindahl index (which
ranges from zero to one) is very high (H=0.856). Concentration in the non-listed AG is lower
(H=0.769) and the lowest in the listed AG (H=0.403). Likewise, the measure of voting power
developed by CUBBIN and LEECH (1983) indicates that the largest shareholder is likely to de-
cide a vote for himself in 62.3 percent of the listed AGs and over 80 percent in both types of
unlisted firms.
Changes in Size of Share Blocks
Previous German studies neglect changes in the ownership structure. Figure 4 addresses this
issue.
                                                
44 See BECHT (1997) for the US and FRANKS and MAYER (1994) for the UK.
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Figure 4: Changes in the Herfindahl Concentration Index (1994-1998)
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Figure 4 depicts the mean change in concentration as measured by the Herfindahl index per
firm. Concentration rises in about 20 percent and falls in about 12 percent of firms, but it is
constant in the large majority of firms (68.0 percent). From this perspective, the selection of a
single year to describe the ownership structure of a firm – as not only previous German stud-
ies do – should not generate a significant bias because ownership structures seem fairly stable.
However, when a distinction is made between the two legal types of firms and between listed
versus non-listed firms the assumption of stable ownership structures cannot be maintained,
particularly not for listed firms. Almost half of the firms being traded on the stock exchange
exhibit increasing shareholder concentration over the last five years (47.2 percent). At the
same time, more than a quarter of those firms show a decreasing concentration of shares (27.8
percent). Concentration of shares does not change in the majority of non-listed firms. Firm-
specific concentration changes in 20-30 percent of these firms.
Table 6: Median Annual Growth Rates in the Herfindahl Index (1994-1998)1
GmbH Non-Listed AG Listed AG Weighted Average2
Rising 2.17 2.27 0.80 1.44
No Change 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Falling -1.23 -1.31 -1.41 -1.29
Number of Observations3 2932 939 706 4592
Note: 1 Median annual growth rate in firm-specific Herfindahl index whereby the firm-specific index is the geo-
metric mean per firm. Excluded were firms that had over 50% of shares with no clearly identified type of share-
holder because this would bias the concentration measure. 2 Including KGaA. 3 The KGaA is not reported here
as a separate category because the number of observations is only 15.
Table 6 gives a rough impression of the relative magnitude of the changes in share concentra-
tion. The median annual increase is higher than the median annual decrease in firm-specific
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share concentration. Combined with the results from Figure 4 this suggests that share concen-
tration increased over the years 1994-1998. This result holds for the non-listed firms because
the positive median change is stronger than the negative median change, while at the same
time more non-listed firms increased than decreased share concentration. For the listed AG
the results are ambiguous because more firms increased than decreased share concentration
but – in the median – the negative change is stronger than the positive change.
In sum, shareholder concentration is high for all types of firms. From this perspective, agency
costs could be small due to the absence of a separation of ownership and control or good
monitoring by the large shareholder. Ownership structure as measured by share concentration
is fairly stable.45 But in about one third of the firms concentration increases or decreases.
Changes particularly occur in the listed AG. Whether the neglect of changes in ownership
structures produces a bias in empirical studies must be examined by further research. 46
4.2 Type of Shareholders
We next classify shareholders into the six groups defined in section 2.3: dispersed sharehold-
ings, individuals, non-financial firms, the state, financial enterprises and foreigners. In 1998,
on average, the largest group of shareholders were non-financial enterprises with a share of
65.1 percent (Table 7). Foreigners hold about 11.1 percent and individuals 7.9 percent of out-
standing shares. In contrast to the influential role assigned to banks in various studies on
German corporate governance47 stands their – on average – very low share of 1.9 percent.
However, banks’ voting power is potentially much greater due to the specific system of proxy
voting, widespread membership of bankers on boards and their role as creditors.48
                                                
45 Changes in the shareholder structure which do not lead to changes in share concentration are neglected here.
We therefore estimate only a lower limit of all changes.
46 A bias would occur if the changes in the ownership structure were not random but would be caused by an
exogenous variable which also influences performance measures.
47 See for example NIBLER (1995) and GORTON and SCHMID (1996).
48 See BAUMS and FRAUNE (1995) on banks’ voting power through proxy votes and PFANNSCHMIDT (1993) on
personal interlockings. Taking into account these additional sources of bank influence EDWARDS and FISCHER
(1994) still reject the hypothesis of strong bank power in corporate governance.
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Table 7: Shareholder Structure by Type and Legal Form
in  percent GmbH Non-Listed AG Listed AG Weighted Average1
1 Dispersed Shares 3.99 9.2 36.1 11.92
2 Individuals 4.00 15.39 10.79 7.85
3 Non-Financial Firms 75.57 62.63 39.55 65.14
4 State 3.04 2.11 1.04 2.41
5 Financial Enterprises 0.40 1.52 6.45 1.93
6 Foreigners 13.00 9.15 6.07 10.75
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Number of Observations2 843 348 318 1519
Notes: 1 Including KGaA. 2 The KGaA is not reported here as a separate category because the number of obser-
vations is only 27.
Table 7 describes the aggregate shareholder structure, i.e. the fraction of shares which is
owned by a particular type of shareholder. Most shares are held by non-financial firms in
listed and non-listed firms. A relatively high fraction is dispersed in the listed AG, whereas
dispersion is low in firms that did not go public. Dispersion of shares is of course a conse-
quence of the decision to go public. The role of individuals as direct shareholders is small,
looking at the fraction of all shares in their hands. They hold about 15.4 percent of the shares
in the non-listed AG, 10.8 percent in the listed AG, and only 4 percent in the GmbH.
This aggregate shareholder structure does not necessarily reflect actual voting power of the
individual types of shareholders. Therefore we look at the type of the largest shareholder in
each firm-year. Since the largest shareholder is not always large enough to dominate all deci-
sions, 49 we additionally check whether the largest shareholder fulfills the voting power crite-
rion of CUBBIN and LEECH (1983).50 If the largest shareholder does not fulfill this criterion,
the respective observation is grouped as dispersed shares.
                                                
49 For example, the largest shareholder holds 51 percent, the second largest shareholder 49 percent. Then the
position of the largest shareholder is much weaker compared to a 99 percent stake in his hands.
50 See section 4.1.
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Table 8: Shareholder Structure: Largest Shareholders by Type 1
in  percent GmbH Non-Listed AG Listed AG Weighted Average2
1 Dispersed Shares 14.75 19.21 37.70 20.65
2 Individuals 2.83 11.78 10.60 6.39
3 Non-Financial Firms 67.92 58.81 41.18 60.25
4 State 2.80 1.59 0.83 2.13
5 Financial Enterprises 0.18 0.42 3.81 0.98
6 Foreigners 11.53 8.19 5.88 9.61
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Number of Observations3 3357 1197 1207 5788
Notes: 1 Type of largest shareholder that is classified as having voting power using the CUBBIN and LEECH
(1983) index. All firms with no large shareholder (just dispersed shares) or those having no large shareholder
with voting power using the CUBBIN and LEECH index are classified as “dispersed”. 2 Including KGaA. 3 The
KGaA is not reported here as a separate category because the number of observations is only 27.
More than 60 percent of the firms are governed by a large shareholder that is another non-
financial firm. These shareholders have not only large stakes. They also have high voting
power due to the small size of other shareholders in their firms. About 20 percent of the firms
can be classified as widely-held what is much more than indicated by Table 7. Foreigners
dominate almost 10 percent of German manufacturing firms by vote, whereas individuals
govern only about 6.4 percent of all firms. The state controls about 2 percent of all firms.
Looking at the three different forms of firms we see differences in the shareholder structure.
More than one third of the firms traded on the stock exchange is widely-held but only 14.8
percent of the GmbH and 19.2 percent of the non-listed AG. Non-financial firms control al-
most 68 percent of GmbH firms, almost 60 percent of non-listed AGs and more than 41 per-
cent of the listed AGs. Financial enterprises govern about 4 percent of the listed AGs; in the
non-listed firms their influence is small. On aggregate, foreigners play only a minor role as
shareholders. The difference between the three types of firms indicates that foreign investors
prefer to invest in a GmbH rather than in a listed AG. Indeed, many of the foreign investments
in GmbHs are 100 percent subsidiaries. Thus, full control seems to be important for a foreign
direct investment in Germany.
Changes in Type of Shareholders
Figure 5 gives more evidence on changes in the ownership structure.
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Figure 5: Changes in the Share Held by Each Type of Shareholder (1994-1998)*
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Note: * Percentage of firms in which shareholder type x holds a share block larger than zero at least in one year
during the period 1994-1998 and in which the mean annual change is different from zero. Depicted for the case
of the listed AG. Excluded are firms that have over 50% of shares with no clearly identified type of shareholder
and firms for which we do not have a continuous history of data without missing values. ** 0% have no change.
Figure 5 depicts the changes in each shareholder category for the period from 1994 to 1998.
For example, given that non-financial firms own a share block in a firm, they do not change
the size of this share block in only 25 percent of the cases. Rather, in 48 percent they increase
the size of their block and decrease its size in 27.7 percent of the firms they are invested in.
The state, in turn, changes the size of all its share blocks. Only non-financial firms and for-
eigners increase rather than decrease the size of their blocks.
Table 9: Median Annual Change in Each Shareholder Category (1994-1998)1
Dispersed
Shares
Individuals Non-Financial
Enterprises
State Financial
Enterprises
Foreigners
Rising 2.60 11.04 0.88 6.30 5.70 8.00
No Change 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Falling -1.05 -6.00 -8.60 -11.25 -2.50 -8.33
Number of
Obs.2
728 211 577 20 200 139
Note: 1 Median annual change in firm-specific size of the share block held by shareholder type x. Excluded are
firms that have over 50% of shares with no clearly identified type of shareholder and firms for which we do not
have a continuous history of data without missing values. 2 Data only for the listed AG.
Table 9 provides quantitative details on the changes in share blocks held by each category of
shareholder. For example, individuals that increase their share blocks during 1994-1998 do
this by about 11 percent. The median annual increase in the share blocks held by non-
financial firms is comparatively low with 0.9 percent, whereas the decrease is rather high with
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-8.6 percent. The decrease is smaller in size with -6 percent. Figure 5 and Table 9 also reflect
recent privatization: the state decreased 75 percent of its share blocks and reduced their size
by about -11.3 percent annually. Overall, we see that changes in the size of the share blocks
are significant in size. These changes in the shareholder structure can also be found for the
non-listed firms but the frequency of changes is lower. In turn, the magnitude of changes is
higher.
What can be learned from this section is that non-financial enterprises are often the largest
and the decisive shareholder. And there are differences in the shareholder structure between
listed and non-listed firms. Differences can also be found among non-listed firms. Second,
there is evidence of significant changes in the shareholder structure in terms of shareholder
type even over the short period of five years. Third, these changes are not uniform over the
three types of firms. Since ownership structure is not constant over time these changes in the
ownership structure must enter empirical studies of corporate governance.
4.3 Pyramids and Cross-Ownership
The third characteristic of ownership structure besides the size and type of individual stakes is
the location of control as defined in section 2.4. Table 10 shows the level of ultimate control,
i.e. the end of a continuous 50 percent-stake control chain.
Pyramids
Table 10: Level of Ultimate Control
1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
Number of Obs. 2527 1478 494 128 8 3 4638
Percent of Total 54.48 31.87 10.65 2.76 0.17 0.06 100.00
Note: Necessary condition for control is a share size of over 50% on each level in the control chain.
In the majority of firms the ultimate owner is located on the first level of the ownership
structure. This suggests that the agency problem resulting from dilution of control in the
pyramid might be low. Only 13.6 percent of the firms are governed through a pyramid with at
least three levels. Among the three types of firms the GmbH has the longest control chains.
Out of the 633 observations with a level of ultimate control above 2 over 82 percent are in the
form of the GmbH. This indicates that the GmbH is the preferred legal form to construct
pyramids.
It must be noted, however, that we eventually underestimate the size of the pyramids because
control chains are not always complete in KSD.
20
Table 11: Ultimate Shareholder versus Dominant Shareholder on First Level by Type
in  percent Dispersed Indi-
viduals
Non-Financial
Enterprises
State Financial
Enterprises
Foreign-
ers
Total Number
of Obs.
First level1 20.65 6.39 60.25 2.13 0.98 9.61 100.00 5788
Ultimate
level2
27.79 9.95 41.59 3.09 0.74 16.84 100.00 5788
Note: 1 Dominant shareholder on first level by type as shown in Table 7. 2 Ultimate shareholder classified ac-
cording to voting power index as done in Table 7.
Table 11 shows the type of the largest shareholder – both on the first level and on the ultimate
level. Both measures are corrected with the voting power index, i.e. the dominant shareholder,
if existent, can decide a vote with a probability of 95 percent. For example, in 60.3 percent of
the firms the dominant shareholder on the first level is a non-financial firm. On the ultimate
level, in 41.6 percent of the firms the ultimate shareholder fulfills this voting criterion. As to
be expected, ownership by corporate shareholders is lower on the ultimate than on the first
level. However, a substantial part of the firms remain in full control by non-financial firms. In
part, this is due to limited data. But it also reflects the fact that non-financial firms have a
strong ultimate voting power which is not subject to control by any individual shareholder. 51
Cash flow rights of the ultimate shareholder can serve as an indicator of the size of another
agency problem: the exploitation of minority shareholders by a majority shareholder. Calcu-
lation of the measure suggested by BEBCHUK et al. (1998) shows that in 97.6 percent of the
firms the ultimate shareholder receives over 50 percent of the cash flow. Only in 2.4 percent
of the firms he can claim a minority fraction of cash flow. From this perspective, there is no
problem of minority shareholder exploitation.
This result is strongly influenced by the very large size of individual stakes on each level. For
example, in over 45 percent of all observations control is exercised by 100 percent stakes on
all levels throughout the pyramid. This mirrors a preference for strict hierarchies in large
firms. To see if there is a discrepancy between cash flow and control rights we correct for the
share size on the first level. 52 Figure 6 shows the cash flow rights calculated as above as a
percentage of the control rights on the first level of the pyramid.
                                                
51 In pyramids, the importance of non-financial firms as decisive shareholders increases with the height of the
pyramid.
52 Share size on the first level is used as a proxy for the desired level of control (see section 2.4.1).
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Figure 6: Cash Flow Rights as a Percentage of Control Rights in Pyramids
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Note: Cash flow rights are calculated as the measure suggested by BEBCHUK et al. (1998). The largest share
block C1 is used as a proxy for (desired) control rights.
Figure 6 confirms that in over 76 percent of all firms cash flow rights are identical with con-
trol rights. There is no agency problem in these firms as far as they are caused by a discrep-
ancy of cash flow and control rights. But for about a quarter of all firms Figure 6 indicates a
discrepancy of cash flow and control. Only 10 percent of all firms can claim 25 percent or less
of the cash flow than they should get looking at their extent of control (measured by C1). 53
But almost 60 percent of the pyramids with no discrepancy of cash flow and control rights
have non-financial institutions at their top what could hinder efficient monitoring.
Cross-Ownership
To check whether the firms in our sample are part of an insider-system we calculate their de-
gree of cross-ownership as defined in section 2.4.2. For the year 1998 we find that out of 1519
firms only 8 are part of an insider-system as the degree of cross-ownership is larger than zero.
Mostly these firms directly own their shares. This is likely to be a result of share buybacks.
The degree of cross-ownership is rather small with on average 8.7 percent.
Next we check whether the ultimate shareholders of the 1519 firms in consideration are part
of an insider-system because firms under the ultimate control of insider-systems are sheltered
from the control of outsiders. For the year 1998 we identify 49 out of 1519 firms as being
                                                
53 It must be kept in mind that only a majority of 75 percent guarantees full control over cash flow. But about 90
percent of the firms fulfill this criterion. For the other 10 percent of firms our measure is a proxy (see section
2.4.1).
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ultimately controlled by an insider-system. The average degree of cross-ownership is only 4.5
percent. This, however, is a result of long loops of cross-shareholdings as Figure 7 illustrates:
Figure 7: Length of Loop in Cross-Shareholdings
In the example of Figure 7 all firms hold a share of 10 percent in each other. But the degree of
cross-shareholdings shrinks with the length of the loop. Therefore and because the length of
the loop is an interesting characteristic of insider-systems by itself Table 12 shows the degree
of cross-ownership by length of loop:
Table 12: Cross-Ownership by Length of Loop1
Length of Loop Number of Firms Degree of Cross-Ownership2
own shares 6 14.19
2 8 14.98
4 23 0.18
6 1 0.27
9 9 7.69
25 10 1.05
Total 57 Weighted Average: 5.07
Note: 1 Length of loop is defined as the number of firms over which a firm holds shares in itself. 2 Degree of
cross-ownership is defined as the size of the share a firm ultimately holds in itself. It is calculated by multiply-
ing the share sizes throughout each loop and then adding the results over all loops of a particular firm.
Table 12 broadly confirms that the degree of cross-ownership as defined in section 2.4.2
shrinks with the length of the loop. We see that six firms hold own shares directly, eight firms
over one intermediate firm. In some cases the length of the loop is very long. These loops
correspond to the well-known figures presented by ADAMS (1994). But in most cases the web
of cross-shareholdings is small in terms of the number of firms involved.
Looking at the small number of firms which are part of an insider-system or ultimately con-
trolled by an insider-system cross-ownership seems to be a phenomenon of minor relevance in
German manufacturing firms. Only 57 (i.e. 3.75 percent) out of 1519 firms fulfill our criteria
for insider-systems. We might underestimate the relevance of insider-systems, however, by
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simply counting the number of insider-controlled firms. Therefore we calculate the fraction of
sales which are generated by insider-controlled firms to total sales. Here we find that the 3.75
percent of insider-controlled firms produce about 7.6 percent of the total output of the 1519
firms for which we have ownership data. The analogous figure for the balance sheet total is
7.4 percent. 54
As a result we find that cross-ownership is of minor relevance when we look at the absolute
number of firms which are controlled by insider-systems. Relevance increases when we look
at the size of these insider-controlled firms: They produce significantly higher output and
have larger balance sheet totals than the average firm which is not controlled by an insider
system. Note that our results represent only a lower bound of the relevance of cross-
ownership in the German manufacturing sector because our definition of the ultimate share-
holder is rather cautious. Shareholdings much lower than 50 percent can be sufficient to con-
trol a firm completely. 55 Finally, this study focuses on the manufacturing sector. Since other
sectors of the German economy, in particular the financial service industry, is known to be
more concentrated and characterized by cross-shareholdings (MONOPOLKOMMISSION 1998:
193), our results might represent a lower bound also in this perspective.
What also can be learned from this section is that pyramids are a relevant phenomenon in
Germany. A minority of firms is controlled through pyramids of three and more levels of
ownership. A separation of cash flow and control cannot be found for the large majority of
firms. As a result, agency costs are not likely to be caused by pyramids. However, if non-
financial firms were weak monitors, this would drive agency costs especially in pyramids
because non-financial firms usually are located at each level and because over 40 percent of
the ultimate shareholders are non-financial firms.
5 Conclusions
This study documents the ownership structures of large German manufacturing firms as an
important element of corporate governance. It addresses several shortcomings of the previous
German empirical literature.
First, principally all types of firms in the legal form of the Kapitalgesellschaft have agency
conflicts resulting from the separation of ownership and control (JENSEN and MECKLING
                                                
54 We could not calculate the analogous figure for the workforce employed because we do not have sufficient
employment data on all 1519 firms.
55 See section 2.4.1.
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1976). We therefore analyze a large sample of listed and non-listed firms with different legal
forms. The results show that German shareholdings are highly concentrated in the hands of a
few large shareholders. The average size of the largest share block is over 81 percent in 1998.
A comparison between listed and non-listed firms shows a lower but still high share concen-
tration for the listed Aktiengesellschaft (AG): 60 percent of the AG firms have a shareholder
that holds more than 50 percent of all shares. From this perspective the potential for agency
conflicts is small.
Further analysis shows that in over 60 percent of the cases the largest shareholder is another
non-financial enterprise. Therefore agency conflicts might arise because the controllers are
plagued by internal agency conflicts (VON THADDEN 1990). Again, this problem is the least
severe for the listed AG.
The second shortcoming of previous analyses we address is the neglect of changes in the
ownership structure over time. Ownership concentration is stable for most non-listed firms but
only for 25 percent of listed firms. It increases in almost half of the AG firms from 1994-
1998. In addition, the ownership structure by type exhibits significant changes. Therefore,
ownership structure is not constant as commonly assumed. This is particularly true for the
case of the listed AG.
Third, the analysis of higher levels of the ownership structure shows that the largest majority
of firms is controlled from the first or second level. Only about 14 percent of the firms are
governed through a pyramid with three or more levels. This suggests that agency costs re-
sulting from a separation of cash flow and control (BEBCHUK et al. 1998) is probably irrele-
vant for most German firms. However, over 40 percent of the ultimate controllers are non-
financial firms making agency costs in the sense of VON THADDEN (1990) likely.
Finally, cross-ownership is not wide-spread in the German manufacturing sector regarding the
absolute number of insider-controlled firms. In terms of firm size insider-systems caused by
cross-shareholdings are a more common but still minor phenomenon. However, in practice
the influence of insider systems might be much greater because we use a rather cautious defi-
nition of ultimate shareholdings. Therefore our results represent only a lower bound for cross-
shareholdings in Germany. Keep also in mind that in this study we exclusively analyze the
German manufacturing sector. The intense discussion of cross-shareholdings in Germany
primarily focuses on the financial service sector (ADAMS 1994).
This study discovered some prospective avenues for future research. First, changes in the
ownership structures should be analyzed in more detail. In this study we analyzed changes in
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the aggregate shareholder concentration and in the aggregate shareholder type. If changes in
individual shareholders can be identified this will allow to analyze the market for ownership
stakes. BETHEL et al. (1998) and RENNEBOOG (1996) document an active share market of
friendly takeovers for the US and Belgium respectively. Especially in the light of the lack of
hostile takeovers in Germany (FRANKS and MAYER 1993) this could be an important mecha-
nism for corporate control. Second, the documented differences between listed and non-listed
firms and the changes in ownership structures do not necessarily imply a bias in previous
studies. For example, only when changes in the ownership structure indeed affect corporate
performance after taking into account the endogeneity problem (BÖRSCH-SUPAN and KÖKE,
1999), the correctness of previous results can be assessed. But this can only be achieved by an
econometric analysis including all relevant mechanisms of corporate governance.
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Appendix: Characteristics of Ownership Structure
Measure Definition of Measure Theoretical Foundation
C1 (C2, C3) Size of largest block (two/three largest blocks) SHLEIFER and VISHNY
(1986)
Herfindahl Index
Herfindahl index å
=
=
N
1i
2
iPH  with Pi being the individual share
DEMSETZ and LEHN (1985)
Voting Power Dummy=1 if probability exceeds 95% that largest shareholder will win a
vote, 0 otherwise:
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C
 with C1 the largest share block, H the Herfindahl index,
F the standard normal distribution function, and the critical value ac taken
from a standard normal distribution (e.g. for a=0.05). If caa ³ the dummy
will be 1.
CUBBIN and LEECH (1983)
Type 1 Dispersed Shares
2 Individuals (Families, Partnerships, Managers)
3 Non-financial enterprises
4 State
5 Banks, insurance companies, mutual and investment funds
6 Foreigners (financial and non-financial firms, state)
BLACK (1992), JENSEN and
MECKLING (1976), POUND
(1988), SHAPIRO and
WILLIG (1990), STULZ
(1988), VON THADDEN
(1990)
Level of Ult i-
mate Control
Level of the end of the control chain with a share of over 50% on each level
of the pyramid
author’s definition
Ultimate Owner Shareholder who has full control over a firm (either directly through a share
of over 50% or indirectly through a pyramid with over 50% majority control
at each level) and itself is not controlled by any majority shareholder
author’s definition
Pyramid: Cash
Flow Rights Cash flow rights of the ultimate shareholder in a pyramid: Õ
=
=a
N
1i
2
ip where
pi>50%
BEBCHUK et al. (1998),
GROSSMAN and HART
(1988), HARRIS and RAVIV
(1988)
Pyramid: Dis-
crepancy of
Cash Flow and
Control
Cash flow rights of the ultimate shareholder divided by the largest direct
share (C1) in the firm at the bottom of the pyramid:
 
a
=b 1
C
 where a is the cash flow rights of the ultimate owner
author’s definition
Insider System A firm is part of an insider system when it directly or indirectly owns some
fraction of its own shares. A firm is controlled by an insider system when its
ultimate shareholder is an insider system
author’s definition
Cross-ownership Size of share stake which a firm owns in itself – either directly or indirectly:
åÕ
= =
=a
J
1j
N
1i
2
ip with p i>1%, N the length of each ownership loop, and J the
number of these loops.
author’s definition
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